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Flexibility and Public Participation:
Refining the Administrative Procedure Act's
Good Cause Exception
Nathanael Payntert

INTRODUCTION
In response to progressively violent and widespread sex offenses and the lenient treatment of offenders, Congress enacted
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA),
which became effective in July 2006.1 SORNA required states to
maintain a sex offender registry and created a new federal criminal offense of "failure to register."2 SORNA included an initial
registration requirement that was to be in force until states
could implement SORNA by the statutory deadline in 2009.3 Importantly, SORNA also granted the Attorney General "authority
to specify the applicability of the requirement of this title to sex
offenders convicted before the enactment of this Act or its implementation."4
Pursuant to this authority, the Attorney General promulgated an interim rule on February 28, 2007, seven months following
the enactment of SORNA. 5 The interim rule applied SORNA to
all sex offenders convicted prior to SORNA's enactment.6 The
Attorney General did not provide a period for notice and public
comment before issuing the order, as is generally required by the

t BA 2009, Brigham Young University; JD Candidate 2012, The University of Chicago Law School.
1 Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), Title 1 of the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub L No 109-248 § 101 et seq, 120 Stat
590 (2006), codified at 18 USC § 2250 and 42 USC § 16901 et seq.
2 The new offense covers any person who (1) "is required to register under
[SORNA]," (2) "is a sex offender ... by reason of a conviction under Federal law" or "travels in interstate or foreign commerce," and (3) "knowingly fails to register or update a
registration." 18 USC § 2250(a).
, 42 USC § 16924(a)(1).
4 42 USC § 16913(d).
5 72 Fed Reg 8894, 8896-97, promulgated as a final rule at 28 CFR § 72.3.
6 Id.
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Administrative Procedure Act (APA), but did allow for postpromulgation comment until April 30, 2007.7 Instead, the Attorney General invoked the "good cause" exception to the APA,
which allows an agency to bypass the notice and comment requirement "when the agency for good cause finds ...

that notice

and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest."8 When invoking the "good cause"
exception, the agency must incorporate into the rules issued a
"brief statement of reasons" for the agency's finding that notice
and comment would be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary
to the public interest."9
The Attorney General justified his decision to forego notice
and comment on two grounds. First, the Attorney General argued that making the rule immediately effective was "necessary
to eliminate any possible uncertainty about the applicability of
the Act's requirements .

.

. to sex offenders whose predicate con-

victions predate the enactment of SORNA."10 Second, he maintained that delaying the implementation of the interim rule
would "impede the effective registration of such sex offenders
and would impair immediate efforts to protect the public from
sex offenders who fail to register through prosecution and the
imposition of criminal sanctions."" According to the Attorney
General, delay in effective registration would result in practical
dangers including "the commission of additional sexual assaults
and child sexual abuse or exploitation offenses by sex offenders."12 Given these factors, the Attorney General concluded that
it would be "contrary to the public interest to adopt this rule with
the prior notice and comment period normally required under 5
U.S.C. § 553(b)."13
The promulgation of the interim rule by the Attorney General applying SORNA retroactively has incurred numerous challenges by sex offenders. Many of these challenges have focused
on the constitutionality of the rule under separation of powers,
due process, and ex post facto doctrines. 14 The challenges have
7 See 5 USC § 553; 72 Fed Reg 8894, 8895.
8 5 USC

§ 553(b)(3)(B).
9 Id.
10 72 Fed Reg at 8896 (cited in note 5).
11 Id.
12 Id at 8896-97.
13 72 Fed Reg at 8897.

14 See, for example, United States v Gould, 568 F3d 459, 461 (4th Cir 2009) (upholding SORNA against Commerce Clause and Ex Post Facto Clause challenges, among other
arguments); United States v Dixon, 551 F3d 578, 583-85 (7th Cir 2008) (Posner)
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overshadowed another question that has become the subject of a
circuit split: does 72 Fed Reg 8894, whereby the Attorney General promulgated an interim rule that retroactively applied
SORNA without a notice and comment period, violate the APA,
rendering the rule invalid?
This Comment suggests that the split between the circuits
should be resolved by placing additional requirements on agencies seeking to invoke the good cause exception. These additional
requirements are especially important when a perceived emergency or threat of serious harm serves as the driving rationale.
Ideally, Congress would amend the language of section 553(b) to
provide more guidance to an agency as it considers invoking the
exception; however, this is an unlikely solution, as several previous attempts have failed. Instead, the APA and courts should
require that an agency invoking the exception detail how delay
would result in an identifiable, measurable, and significant impact on public safety. This is in contrast to the "brief statement
of reasons" currently required by the APA. Additionally, when an
agency invokes the good cause exception due to emergency or
because delay would cause serious harm, the APA and courts
should demand that the agency show how the emergency or
harm is more serious than when Congress gave the agency statutory authority to make the rule.
Part I of this Comment reviews leading cases in the circuit
split regarding whether the Attorney General validly promulgated the interim rule. Part II suggests that, while the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits reached the correct result, neither side of the circuit split adequately analyzed the issue. This Comment proposes
that, in order to limit the power given to agencies acting in a
quasi-legislative capacity, and to protect basic principles of representative democracy in rulemaking, changes to the good cause
exception are necessary.
I. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Part I of this Comment summarizes the positions taken by
each circuit. Parts L.A and B detail the position taken by the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits: that the Attorney General improperly
bypassed the notice and comment requirement of the APA,
(upholding SORNA against non-delegation and Due Process Clause challenges, but finding it unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause as applied to one defendant), revd
and remd by Carr v United States, 130 S Ct 2229 (2010) (finding it unnecessary to pass
on any of the constitutional questions).
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thereby rendering the regulation invalid. Parts I.C and D detail
the position of the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, which held that
the Attorney General's public safety argument provided good
cause for bypassing notice and comment. 15 Part I.E discusses the
Seventh Circuit's case law, which suggests that it would likely
agree with the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits that good cause existed for bypassing notice and comment. 16 Part I.F details the
position articulated by Judge Charles Wilson in his Dean concurrence. Judge Wilson agreed with the Sixth Circuit that the Attorney General's public safety argument was an insufficient justification, but he concurred in result because of the harmless error doctrine, creating a possible third position. Last, Part I.G
briefly notes the Supreme Court's silence on the issue.
A.

The Sixth Circuit's Position

The Sixth Circuit held that, in bypassing notice and comment, the Attorney General's interim rule violated the APA because the Attorney General failed to demonstrate good cause.
The Sixth Circuit considered the issue in United States v Cain.7
In Cain, the defendant, Marcus Cain, had been convicted in Ohio
of attempted rape in October 1998. His sentence required him to
"register as a sex offender with the state, verify his address annually, and notify the sheriff within seven days of changing his
residence." 8 Cain moved to Georgia during the summer of 2006
and failed to update his registration, prompting Ohio to issue a
warrant for his arrest. 9 In March 2007, after the Attorney General had promulgated the interim rule making SORNA retroactive, Georgia authorities arrested Cain. After Ohio dismissed its
charges for unspecified reasons, a federal grand jury indicted
Cain for violating SORNA.
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by emphasizing that the
purpose of the notice and comment requirement is to give "interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making."20
1 See United States v Gould,568 F3d 459, 470 (4th Cir 2009); United States vDean,
604 F3d 1275, 1282 (11th Cir 2010).
16 Although the Seventh Circuit has not discussed the merits of the Attorney General's decision to bypass notice and comment, its dismissive approach towards claims
attacking the procedural merits of the regulation has caused several of its sister circuits
to infer that it falls in line with the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits. See Dean, 604 F3d at
1290; UnitedStates v Utescb, 596 F3d 302, 309 n 7 (6th Cir 2010).
17 583 F3d 408 (6th Cir 2009).
1 Id at 411.

19 Id.

20 Id at 420, quoting 5 USC

§ 553(c).
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Doing so, the court argued, increases the quality of rules and
"helps 'ensure fair treatment for persons to be affected by' regulation."2 1 Because the agency is acting in a quasi-legislative capacity, it is generally required to follow the APA's quasilegislative notice and comment procedures. The court then
turned to the justifications offered by the Attorney General for
invoking the good cause exception.
With regard to the "uncertainty" argument, the court found
that it "misses the mark" for three reasons. 22 First, "a desire to
provide guidance to regulated parties is not sufficient to show
good cause to bypass the notice and comment provisions of the
APA."23 Suspension of notice and comment for good cause must
be "supported by more than the bare need to have regulations." 24
Second, Congress chose to both "delegate regulatory authority to
the Attorney General and to decline to bypass the APA's requirements." 25 The decision inevitably meant that "some period
of uncertainty would follow while the Attorney General conducted regulatory procedures." 26 Last, by "delegating regulatory authority to the Attorney General rather than creating law itself,
Congress created a period of delay at least long enough for the
Attorney General to promulgate his specification." 27 In other
words, Congress had already "balanced the costs and benefits of
an immediately effective rule compared to the delayed implementation of a reasoned regulation." 28
The court next turned to the public safety argument and determined that SORNA retroactivity "does not present the type of
safety emergency that some courts have relied upon to find just
cause to bypass notice and comment."29 The court acknowledged
bypassing notice and comment may be appropriate when "a safety investigation shows that a new safety rule must be put in
place immediately." 30 But the court noted that such a considera21 Cain, 583 F3d at 420, quoting Dismas Charities,Inc v United States Department

ofJustice,401 F3d 666, 678 (6th Cir 2005).
22 Cain, 583 F3d at 421.
23

Id.
24 Id, quoting National Association of Farn workers Organizations v Marshall, 628

F2d 604, 621 (DC Cir 1980).
25 Cain, 583 F3d at 421.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28

Id.

29 Cain,583 F3d at 422.
30 Id, quoting Utility Solid Waste Activities Group v EPA, 236 F3d 749, 754 (DC Cir

2001).
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tion has been "used for dispensing with notice and comment
when the emergency arose after the statutory enactment at issue."31 As an example, the court pointed to the Federal Aviation
Administration's (FAA) emergency regulation following several
helicopter accidents causing four deaths. The FAA "cited the specific accident record that prompted it to take action" and dispensed with the notice and comment period. 32 In contrast, the
"Attorney General gave no specific evidence of actual harm to the
public in his conclusory statement of reasons, and gave no explanation for why he could act in an emergency fashion when Congress had not deemed the situation so critical seven months earlier."33
B. The Ninth Circuit's Position
In UnitedStates v Valverde,34 the Ninth Circuit agreed with
the Sixth Circuit's analysis. 35 In 2002, Mark Valverde pled guilty
to eleven counts of sexual abuse of a minor and was sentenced to
twelve years in prison. Before his release, Valverde signed a form
notifying him that he was required to register as a sex offender
in California within five days of his release, and within ten days
of moving to any other state. After his release, Valverde failed to
register in any state, and police apprehended him a month later
in Missouri. 36
Like the Sixth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the Attorney General's "clarification" justification, noting that "[an
interest in eliminating any possible uncertainty about the application of SORNA is not a reasonable justification for bypassing
notice and comment." 37 The court also emphasized that the Attorney General, without explanation, waited seven months before
issuing the rule.
On the public safety justification, the court also closely followed the Sixth Circuit. The court noted that the Attorney General "did little more than restate the general dangers of child
sexual assault, abuse, and exploitation that Congress had sought
to prevent when it enacted SORNA."38 According to the court,
a1 Cain, 583 F3d at 422.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 628 F3d 1159 (9th Cir 2010).

35 Id at 1165.
36 Id at 1160-61.
37 Id at 1166.
38 Valverde, 628 F3d at 1167.
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this did not explain "why the Act's requirements should be made
retroactively applicable on an emergency basis when Congress
had declined to do so."39 The court held that the harms cited by
the Attorney General were insufficient to upset the balance that
Congress had already struck in declining to make SORNA retroactive immediately. The interim rule was therefore held invalid. 40
C.

The Fourth Circuit's Position

In United States v Gould,41 the Fourth Circuit became the
first to consider the validity of the Attorney General's interim
rule. 4 2 In this case, a court in the District of Columbia had convicted Brian Gould of a sex offense in 1985.43 Pre-SORNA law
required Gould to register as a sex offender upon his release in
2002. The laws also required him to register in any state where
he chose to reside. 44 Prior to 2007, Gould made several interstate
moves and failed to update his registration. 45 Approximately one
year after Congress enacted SORNA, Maryland police arrested
and charged Gould with violating the Act for failing to register in
Maryland.46 Gould argued that the district court should have
dismissed his indictment because the Attorney General violated
the APA in promulgating the interim regulations without a notice and comment period. 47
In a brief discussion, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that
the good cause exception is meant to be construed narrowly but
went on to hold that the Attorney General had good cause to invoke the exception.48 The court agreed that "[t]here was a need
for legal certainty about SORNA's 'retroactive' application to sex
offenders convicted before SORNA." 49 It also recognized "a concern for public safety that these offenders be registered in accordance with SORNA as quickly as possible."50 According to the
39 Id.
40 Id at 1168.

41 568 F3d 459 (4th Cir 2009).
42 Id at 470.

4 Id at 461.
4 Id.

45 Gould,568 F3d at 461.
46 Id.
7 Id.
48 Id at 469-70.
49 Gould,568 F3d at 470.
5o Id.
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court, "[d]elaying implementation of the regulation to accommodate notice and comment could reasonably be found to put the
public safety at greater risk." 1 Additionally, the court saw the
post-promulgation public comment as mitigating the potential
damage done by not allowing for the initial notice and comment
period. 52
The majority opinion drew a lengthy dissent from Judge
Blane Michael, who argued that the Attorney General's justification was inadequate. 53 Judge Michael first dismissed the Attorney General's "immediate guidance" justification. He noted that,
if the need to provide "immediate guidance and information constituted 'good cause,' then an exception to the notice requirement
would be created that would swallow the rule." 54 For this reason,
noted Judge Michael, courts have "looked askance at agencies'
attempts to avoid the standard notice and comment procedures."55 And courts have consistently held that the exception be
"narrowly construed and only reluctantly countenanced."56
Judge Michael then turned to the Attorney General's public
safety argument. Judge Michael argued that the Attorney General's declaration that SORNA applies retroactively "did not have
the immediate effect of compelling any additional sex offenders
to register; nor did it provide any additional registration information either to states or to the federal government."57 The interim rule simply gave the federal government power to prosecute
unregistered sex offenders who were already subject to prosecution under state law.5 8 Thus, the interim rule making SORNA
retroactive did not in fact increase registration requirements
that would make the public safer.59
Finally, Judge Michael argued that, if Congress wanted the
Attorney General to make a decision on the retroactivity of
SORNA without notice and comment, it had the option of either
declaring SORNA to apply retroactively itself or expressly authorizing the Attorney General to bypass APA procedures.60 For
51 Id.
52 Id.

53 Gould, 568 F3d at 475 (Michael dissenting).
5 Id, quoting Zhang v Slattery,55 F3d 732, 746-47 (2d Cir 1995).
55 Gould, 568 F3d at 478 (Michael dissenting), quoting Asiana Airlines v FAA, 134
F3d 393, 396 (DC Cir 1998).
6 Gould, 568 F3d at 478 (Michael dissenting).
57 Id.
58 Id.

59 Id.
60 Gould,568 F3d at 480 (Michael dissenting), citing Asiana Airlines, 134 F3d at 398.
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these reasons Judge Michael concluded that "allowing the Attorney General to sidestep the requirements of the APA here establishels] a dangerous precedent."61
D.

The Eleventh Circuit's Position

In United States v Dean,62 the Eleventh Circuit agreed with
the Fourth Circuit that the Attorney General had good cause to
bypass notice and comment. 63 In early 1994, a Minnesota court
convicted Christopher Dean of a sex offense, which meant that
he was required to register as a sex offender in Minnesota or any
state to which he relocated. 64 Sometime between July 2007 and
August 2007, Dean traveled to Alabama and failed to register
there. Dean was arrested in 2008 and charged under SORNA. 65
Dean challenged the validity of SORNA, arguing it violated the
APA, and moved to have his indictment dismissed. 66 The court
acknowledged the split that had developed and proceeded to
evaluate the Attorney General's decision in light of the difference
of opinion among the federal courts.
The court first evaluated the Attorney General's guidance
argument and found that, while it alone "may not have established the good cause exception, it does count to some extent."6 7
The court distinguished this situation from other agency rules
where the agency designed the rule based on the submissions of
those to be regulated. 68 In such a situation those being regulated
already have some guidance because they essentially formulated
the rule. Here, Congress granted the Attorney General sole discretion to determine whether SORNA applies retroactively.
There was no guidance in place. 69
Before moving to the Attorney General's public safety justification, the Eleventh Circuit distanced itself from the Fourth Circuit and joined the Sixth Circuit regarding the ameliorating ef-

61 Id at 482.

62 604 F3d 1275 (11th Cir 2010).
63 Id at 1282.

64 Id at 1276.
65 Id.

66 Id at 1276. Dean also raised constitutional challenges to SORNA, all of which were
rejected by the court.
67 Dean, 604 F3d at 1280.
68 Id at 1280, citing United States Steel Corp v United States EPA, 595 F2d 207, 214
(5th Cir 1979).
69 Dean, 604 F3d at 1280.
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fect of post-promulgation comments.7 0 The court pointed out that
it had previously rejected the "harmless error argument" in

United States Steel Corp v United States EPA. 71 In United
States Steel the court noted that "[s]ection 553 is designed to ensure that affected parties have an opportunity to participate in
and influence agency decision making at an early stage, when
the agency is more likely to give real consideration to alternative
ideas."72 The court held that "allowing post-promulgation comments to resolve any harm caused by a lack of notice and comment would render the notice and comment provision toothless."73
The Eleventh Circuit then turned to the Attorney General's
public safety justification and concluded that it "is good cause for
bypassing the notice and comment period."7 4 The court noted
that the rule allowed the federal government to immediately
start prosecuting sex offenders who failed to register in state registries. 75 It thereby reduced "the risk of additional sexual assaults and sexual abuse by sex offenders." 76
The court disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's holding that the
good cause exception can only be invoked in emergency situations. The Eleventh Circuit observed that the Sixth Circuit based
its contrary holding on a misreading of cases from the Ninth and
DC Circuits. Citing to the same DC Circuit case mentioned by
the Sixth Circuit in Cain, the court pointed out that "the exception excuses notice and comment in emergency situations, or
where delay could result in serious harm."7 7 The court went on to
hold that "there does not need to be an emergency situation and
the Attorney General only has to show that there is good cause to
believe that delay would do real harm."7 8
The Eleventh Circuit also disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's
concern that Congress built in a period of delay and that the Attorney General delayed seven months in promulgating the rule,
and that therefore avoiding delay cannot constitute good cause.7 9
70 Id at 1280-81.

71 Id at 1280, citing UnitedStates Steel Corp v UnitedStates EPA, 595 F2d 207, 214

(5th Cir 1979).
72 Dean, 604 F3d at 1280-81.
73 Id at 1281.

Id.
7 Id.
74

76 Dean, 604 F3d at 1281.

n Id, quoting Jifry vF4A, 370 F3d 1174, 1179 (DC Cir 2004) (emphasis in Dean).
7 Dean, 604 F3d at 1281.
7 Id at 1282, citing Cain, 583 F3d at 421.
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The Eleventh Circuit responded that "[a]ll Congressional directives to an agency to implement rules are subject to delay as the
agency considers the rule and then promulgates it."80 Therefore,
"[i]f Congress were required to create the substantive administrative rules by itself to avoid notice and comment, then the good
cause exception would be meaningless."8 1
The court also addressed whether retroactive application of
SORNA would improve public safety given that it did not compel
additional registration-an issue raised by Judge Michael in his
Gould dissent. 82 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with Judge Michael, responding that "[p]ublic safety is improved by federal law
that allows the federal government to pursue sex offenders regardless of existing state laws providing for state prosecution."8 3
Federal involvement makes additional resources available and
increases the government's ability to "locat[e] and apprehend[ ]"
sex offenders who fail to register. 84
The Seventh Circuit's Position

E.

Although the Seventh Circuit has not explicitly articulated
its position on the validity of the Attorney General's interim rule,
its opinion in United States v Dixon85 suggests that it would uphold the regulation as valid, aligning itself with the Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits.86 In Dixon, the Seventh Circuit consolidated
the appeals of two defendants convicted of violating SORNA for
not registering based on sex offenses committed before the act
was passed.87 As the court turned its attention to the defendants'
constitutional claims, it stated that "[tihe remaining arguments
made by Dixon (other than a frivolous argument based on the
Administrative Procedure Act) are based on the Constitution." 88
While the court went no further in elaborating on the "frivolous"
APA argument, other circuits have interpreted the statement as
referencing the Attorney General's decision to bypass the notice
and comment period for good cause.89
80 Dean, 604 F3d at 1282.
81 Id.

82 Id. See Gould,568 F3d at 479 (Michael dissenting).
83 Dean, 604 F3d at 1281.
84

Id.

85 551 F3d 578 (7th Cir 2008) (Posner).
86 Id at 583.
81 Id at 581.
88 Id at 583 (emphasis added).
89 See Dean, 604 F3d at 1290 (Wilson concurring); Utesch, 596 F3d at 309 n 9.
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A Possible Third Position-The Dean Concurrence

In his concurring opinion in Dean, Judge Wilson took a third
position. 90 Judge Wilson expressed concern that the majority's
opinion made it easier for an administrative agency to avoid notice and comment.9 1 He agreed with the Sixth and Ninth Circuits
that the Attorney General's public safety justification fell short
and that there was clearly a "lack of an emergency or threat of
real harm attending the promulgation of the regulation." 92 Judge
Wilson also agreed that "Congress factored delay into SORNA
when it wrote the law" and could have released the Attorney
General from the APA requirement had it wanted to do so. 9 3
Consequently, the Attorney General did not promulgate the law
in accordance with the APA because his good cause justifications
were insufficient. Yet Judge Wilson upheld Dean's conviction
relying instead on the harmless error rule. 9 4
Judge Wilson noted that the APA requires reviewing courts
to take "due account . .. of the rule of prejudicial error."95 As an-

other court has interpreted that provision, "[i]f the agency's mistake did not affect the outcome, if it did not prejudice the petitioner, it would be senseless to vacate and remand for reconsideration."9 6 Determining whether Dean was prejudiced by not
having an opportunity for pre-promulgation comment requires
that Dean show "that he could have arguably mounted a 'credible
challenge' for changing the rule as it affected him."9 7 Because
there was nothing in Dean's appellate brief or at oral argument
suggesting a reason that might "have persuaded the Attorney
General not to extend SORNA," Judge Wilson concluded that
Dean suffered no prejudice.98 In taking this position Wilson
acknowledged that he was creating a third position in the current split.99 He urged the Supreme Court to resolve the dispute.10 0
9o Dean, 604 F3d at 1282-90 (Wilson concurring).
91 Id at 1290.
92 Id at 1283.
93 Id at 1287.
94 Dean,604 F3d at 1288 (Wilson concurring).
95 Id, quoting 5 USC § 706.
96 Dean, 604 F3d at 1288, quoting PDK LaboratoriesInc v United States DEA, 362
F3d 786, 789 (DC Cir 2004).
97 Dean, 604 F3d at 1288 (Wilson concurring).
98 Id.

9 Id at 1290.
100 Id.
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The Supreme Court's Silence

The Supreme Court declined to address the issue in Carr v
United States0 1 when it reviewed the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Dixon.10 2 In a footnote, the Court acknowledged and described
the circuit split, but refused to clarify, stating, "[w]e similarly
express no view as to whether § 72.3 was properly promulgateda question that has also divided the circuits." 103
II. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Part II.A discusses the importance of notice and comment in
informal rulemaking and the high standard for invoking the good
cause exception that has emerged as a result. Part II.B discusses
why none of the circuits offer a satisfactory analysis of the good
cause exception in assessing the interim rule's validity. Part II.C
discusses why Congress should amend section 553(b)(3)(B) of the
APA to clarify the requirements for bypassing notice and comment.
A. Notice and Comment
The APA allows an agency to bypass the notice and comment
period when the agency "for good cause finds ... that notice and
public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest."1 04 The good cause exception is a potentially powerful tool given to agencies to provide flexibility in
rulemaking. While flexibility is desirable given what can often be
a long and tedious process, the potential for misuse of the good
cause exception raises questions concerning agency accountability.
As an initial matter, it is important to recognize that the Attorney General acted in a quasi-legislative capacity when he
passed the interim regulation. The Sixth Circuit recognized this
in Cain: "Because the Attorney General's specification puts new
criminal liability on the acts or omissions of regulated persons, it
is quintessentially legislative, as compared with regulations that
merely restate or interpret statutory obligations." 0 5 In keeping
with basic democratic principles, when an agency acts in a quasi101

130 S Ct 2229 (2010).

102 Id at 2234 n 2.
103 Id.

104 5 USC § 553(b)(3)(B).
105 Cain, 583 F3d at 420.
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legislative capacity, Congress generally requires it to follow the
quasi-legislative notice and comment procedures of the APA. 06
Furthermore, courts treat notice and comment as especially important when a regulation creates or broadens a criminal offense
punishable by imprisonment.107 Courts have held that in such
situations exceptions to the notice and comment procedure of the
APA "must be narrowly construed."108
The DC Circuit has explained that the essential purpose of
the notice and comment procedure is "to reintroduce public participation and fairness to affected parties after governmental authority has been delegated to unrepresentative agencies."109 The
notice and comment procedure is intended to engage the public
and solicit input, thereby allowing the agency to craft the best
rule possible.110 Additionally, the notice and comment period
gives persons who are likely to be affected by the regulation an
opportunity to participate. This helps ensure fair treatment and
that "the content of the final rule is consistent with the will of
the public at large.""' Adherence to notice and comment requirements can also have beneficial secondary effects. A rule
passed by an agency is more likely to be seen as legitimate when
the public participates in its formulation.112 In this way it serves
as a "symbolic reassurance," which promotes acceptability among
the public and can alleviate some of an agency's burdens of enforcement. 113
Courts on both sides of the split have agreed that the postpromulgation period does not ameliorate the lack of prepromulgation notice and comment.114 An agency is much less
likely to alter or modify a rule after it has already been promul106 Id.

107 See, for example, United States v Picciotto,875 F2d 345, 348 (DC Cir 1989) (Mikva) ("The fact that this rule establishes a criminal offense entailing possible imprisonment for the violator is even more reason for this court to be wary of the agency's last
minute justifications.").
Id.
109 See Batterton v Marshall,648 F2d 694, 703 (DC Cir 1980) (supported by a citation
10

to the APA's legislative history).
110 Cain, 583 F3d at 420, quoting Dismas Charities,Inc v United States Department
ofJustice,401 F3d 666, 680 (6th Cir 2005) (calling Congress's primary purpose for imposing notice and comment to "get public input so as to get the wisest rules").
111 Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause Exception to Notice and Comment Rulemaking:
Requirements under the Administrative ProcedureAct, 3 Admin L J 317, 422 (1989).
112 Id at 423.
113 See generally Ellen R. Jordan, The Administrative ProcedureAct's "Good Cause"
Exception, 36 Admin L Rev 113 (1984).
114 See Dean, 604 F3d at 1280; Utesch, 596 F3d at 310.
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gated.1 15 Because rulemaking is a delegation of legislative power
to an unrepresentative body, providing interested members of
the public an opportunity to participate is crucial to the maintenance of a representative form of government.
Courts and Congress alike have recognized the dangers of allowing the APA's procedural safeguards to be bypassed too easily. The Act's legislative history makes clear that the exception
was not meant to be an "escape clause": "The exemption of situations of emergency or necessity is not an 'escape clause' in the
sense that any agency has discretion to disregard its terms or the
facts. A true and supported or supportable finding of necessity or
emergency must be made and published."1 16 Accordingly, courts
have consistently held that the "good cause" exception is to be
"narrowly construed and only reluctantly countenanced."1 1 7 Indeed, the burden on the agency to show that good cause exists
when criminal sanctions are at issue is a heavy one. 118 Both the
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits acknowledged that the exception
should be construed narrowly, yet neither seemed to have evaluated the Attorney General's justifications with the type of scrutiny such a standard would demand. 119 This was precisely the criticism leveled by Judge Wilson in his Dean concurrence, where he
lamented that the "majority opinion quotes but does not give due
weight to our circuit's law requiring us to construe narrowly the
good cause exceptions to notice and comment." 120
B. Why Neither Side of the Split Satisfies
The good cause exception has been applied primarily in
three situations: (1) where public notice and comment prior to
rule promulgation would frustrate the agency's purpose; (2)
where the delay caused by notice and comment would cause the
agency to miss a statutory deadline; 121 and (3) where there is an
115 United States Steel Corp v EPA, 649 F2d 572, 576 (8th Cir 1981), quoting Sharon
Steel Corp v EPA, 597 F2d 377, 381 (3d Cir 1979) ("After the final rule is issued, the
petitioner must come hat-in-hand and run the risk that the decisionmaker is likely to
resist change.").
116 Administrative Procedure Act, S Rep No 79-752, 79th Cong, 1st Sess 14 (1945).
117 See, for example, Utility Solid Waste Activities Group v EPA, 236 F3d 749, 754
(DC Cir 2001).
1ts United States v Garilovic,551 F2d 1099, 1105 (8th Cir 1977).
119 See Gould,568 F3d at 470; Dean, 604 F3d at 1279.
120 Dean, 604 F3d at 1283 (Wilson concurring).
121 See Petry v Block, 737 F2d 1193, 1203 (DC Cir 1984); Kollett v Harris,619 F2d
134, 145 (1st Cir 1980); Republic Steel Corp v Costle, 621 F2d 797, 803-04 (6th Cir 1980);
United States Steel Corp v United States EPA, 605 F2d 283, 287 (7th Cir 1979); United
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emergency, or where delay would result in serious harm. 1 22 The
Attorney General's use of good cause falls into the third category.
Yet, this Comment contends that neither side of the circuit split
provides an adequate analysis of the issue. The Sixth and Ninth
Circuits, while correct in result, were wrong to require that the
Attorney General demonstrate an emergency situation. In so doing the courts failed to give proper consideration to whether the
delay would cause serious harm. The Eleventh Circuit's holding
that the good cause exception is proper in situations of emergency, or where delay would cause serious harm, is consistent with
the case law. 123 It is also consistent with the rationale for having
an exception. But the court wrongly concluded that the appropriate question for the Attorney General to ask when considering
whether to invoke the exception is "whether further delay will
cause harm."124 This approach fails to give enough weight to the
balancing performed by Congress in determining whether immediate implementation was necessary when it passed the statute.
The Attorney General justified invoking the good cause exception by including the following statement in the interim rule
as required by the APA:
The immediate effectiveness of this rule is necessary to
eliminate any possible uncertainty about the applicability
of the Act's requirements. . . to sex offenders whose predicate convictions predate the enactment of SORNA. Delay
in the implementation of this rule would impede the effective registration of such sex offenders and would impair
immediate efforts to protect the public from sex offenders
who fail to register through prosecution and the imposition of criminal sanctions. The resulting practical dangers
include the commission of additional sexual assaults and
child sexual abuse or exploitation offenses by sex offendStates Steel, 649 F2d at 575. But see United States Steel, 595 F2d at 213 ("[The mere
existence of deadlines for agency action, whether set by statute or court order, does not in
itself constitute good cause for a 553(b)(B) [sic] exception.").
122 See Jifry v FAA, 370 F3d 1174, 1179 (DC Cir 2004) ("The exception excuses notice
and comment in emergency situations, or where delay could result in serious harm.");
NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc v Evans, 316 F3d 904, 911 (9th Cir 2003), quoting HawaiiHelicopter OperatorsAssociation v FAA, 51 F3d 212, 214 (9th Cir 1995), and
Riverbend Farms, Inc v Madigan, 958 F2d 1479, 1484 n 2 (9th Cir 1992) ("Notice and
comment procedures should be waived only when delay would do real harm. Emergencies,
though not the only situations constituting good cause, are the most common.").
123 Dean, 604 F3d at 1281. See United States Steel, 595 F2d at 214 (The good cause
exception "is an important safety valve to be used where delay would do real harm.").
124 Dean, 604 F3d at 1281.
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ers that could have been prevented had local authorities
and the community been aware of their presence, in addition to greater difficulty in apprehending perpetrators
who have not been registered and tracked as provided by
SORNA. This would thwart the legislative objective of
"protect[ing] the public from sex offenders and offenders
against children" by establishing "a comprehensive national system of registration of those offenders," SORNA
§ 102, because a substantial class of sex offenders could
evade the Act's registration requirements and enforcement mechanisms during the pendency of a proposed rule
and delay in the effectiveness of a final rule. 125
The Attorney General's first justification-that bypassing
the notice and comment period was necessary to eliminate uncertainty-need not detain us long. The Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits agree that the need to eliminate uncertainty and provide
guidance is not sufficient, by itself, to justify bypassing the notice
and comment period. But while the Sixth and Ninth Circuits
dismissed the Attorney General's guidance argument outright,
the Eleventh Circuit decided it "counted for something" in justifying a good cause exception. 126
1.

Sixth and Ninth Circuits

Both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits argued that "SORNA retroactivity ... does not present the type of safety emergency that
some courts have relied upon to find just cause to bypass notice
and comment." 127 The argument is based on the notion that Congress balanced the delay inherent in administrative decision
making against the need for immediately applying SORNA retroactively when it wrote the law. If Congress had considered
making SORNA retroactive in an emergency situation, it could
have freed the Attorney General from the procedural requirements of the APA; Congress also could have dealt with the retroactivity issue itself. The Attorney General offered no evidence
that the gravity of the situation had changed between the time
Congress passed on its opportunity to free the Attorney General
from the APA requirements and the time he chose to bypass the
notice and comment period.
125 72 Fed Reg 8894, 8896.

126 See Cain, 583 F3d at 421; Dean, 604 F3d at 1280.
127 Cain, 583 F3d at 422.
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In focusing solely on emergency situations, however, the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits failed to consider what serious harm a
delay in implementing the rule might cause. The Sixth Circuit
stated only that "the Attorney General gave no specific evidence
of actual harm to the public in his conclusory statement of reasons, and gave no explanation for why he could act in an emergency fashion when Congress had not deemed the situation so
critical seven months earlier."128 The Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Valverde is equally sparse. Yet several circuits have noted that
emergencies, as well as situations where delay could result in
serious harm, justify use of the good cause exception.129 The
Sixth and Ninth Circuits ignored the "real harm" argument and
thereby failed to fully consider the Attorney General's justification for bypassing the notice and comment period.
2.

Eleventh Circuit

30

The Eleventh Circuit held that an emergency is not necessary; the Attorney General only needs to show that there is good
cause to believe that delay would cause real harm. The court relied on its own precedent in United States Steel, which held that
the good cause exception is "an important safety valve to be used
where delay would do real harm." 13 1 The court argued that the
retroactive application of the rule "allowed the federal government to immediately start prosecuting sex offenders who failed
to register in state registries."132 In "practical terms," the court
argued, "the retroactive rule reduced the risk of additional sexual
assaults and sexual abuse by sex offenders by allowing federal
authorities to apprehend and prosecute them." 3 3 Thus, delay in
employing these additional federal resources would do real harm.
The Eleventh Circuit's holding that it is not necessary that
there be an emergency is consistent with its own precedent, the
128

Id.
129 See Jifry, 370 F3d at 1179 ("The exception excuses notice and comment in emergency situations, or where delay could result in serious harm."); Natural Resources, 316
F3d at 910 ("Notice and comment procedures should be waived only when delay would do
real harm. Emergencies, though not the only situation constituting good cause, are the
most common.").
130 Because both the Fourth and Seventh Circuits provided very little analysis regarding the Attorney General's justification for invoking the good cause exception, the argument presented by the Eleventh Circuit in its Dean opinion will be the focus of this section.
131 UnitedStates Steel, 595 F2d at 214.
132 Dean, 604 F3d at 1281.
133 Id.
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precedent of other circuits, and the purpose of having a good
cause exception. It is important that agencies maintain some
flexibility in promulgating rules. If in fact following the APA procedures would cause serious harm to the public interest, the good
cause exception should become a possible avenue for mitigating
that harm. But the Eleventh Circuit's reliance on serious harm
to hold the interim rule valid is lacking for two reasons: (1) in
order to avoid doing violence to the democratic principles articulated above, the serious harm used to invoke the good cause exception must be of a more serious nature than when Congress
passed the statute granting the agency rulemaking authority; (2)
more should be required of the agency than simply expressing a
belief that delay would do real harm. As explained in more detail
below, the agency should be required to demonstrate, in the
statement accompanying the rule, details as to what that harm
would be and how bypassing notice and comment would mitigate
it.
As already discussed, in passing SORNA Congress was
aware of the threats posed by the sex offenders it targeted. Congress was also aware of the delay that often accompanies agency
actions governed by the APA, yet Congress chose not to make
SORNA retroactive immediately or free the Attorney General of
his obligation to follow the APA. In short, Congress balanced the
potential harm of delay against the implications of bypassing the
notice and comment period. It was not for the Attorney General
to decide whether Congress made the right decision. Given his
quasi-legislative role in the rule promulgation process, he was
bound by the procedural safeguards in place.
The Eleventh Circuit's assertion that requiring Congress to
create the substantive administrative rule by itself so as to avoid
notice and comment would render the good cause exception
meaningless is misplaced. Congress need not make the substantive administrative rule but merely free the agency from following APA notice and comment requirements. This does not render
the good cause exception meaningless but rather preserves its
usefulness. Invoking the exception because delay would cause
serious harm should be limited to situations where circumstances have changed, making the potential harm a more serious one
than was present when Congress considered the issue. The appropriate question is not whether further delay would cause
harm as suggested by the court, but whether the harm caused by
delay is a new or more serious harm than the harm Congress
anticipated when balancing the delay inherent in using adminis-
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trative agencies against the democratic principles behind public
participation.
In his statement, the Attorney General failed to show that
delay would cause serious harm beyond the type present when
Congress passed SORNA. The Ninth Circuit noted that "the Attorney General did little more than restate the general dangers
of child sexual assault, abuse, and exploitation that Congress
had sought to prevent when it enacted SORNA." 134 Importantly,
the Attorney General made no showing of an "increase in the
incidence of sex offenses[,] no reports of underprosecution or underenforcement against pre-enactment offenders."1 3 5 The Attorney General also failed to provide "facts to support the asserted
'greater difficulty in apprehending perpetrators who have not
been registered and tracked as provided by SORNA,' that were
not already before Congress when it delegated rulemaking authority to the Attorney General." 136 In short, the harm that concerned the Eleventh Circuit was the same upon which Congress
considered but did not act. The lack of evidence demonstrating
that a more serious harm had developed failed to meet the high
standard for invoking the good cause exception.
3.

Judge Wilson's Harmless Error Position

Courts have generally disregarded the harmless error doctrine as a remedy when agencies violate APA procedures.137 This
position is sound. Once an agency deprives interested persons of
their procedural rights to participate in rulemaking, the error
cannot be considered harmless. Public participation in rulemaking affords interested parties an opportunity to be heard and is
consistent with democratic principles. When the opportunity is
taken away, it diminishes those principles and the individuals
who rely on them.
As applied to the APA, an error is considered harmful whenever there is any "possibilitythat the error would have resulted
in some change in the final rule."13 8 Given the political environment surrounding sex offender laws, it is possible that the final
134 Valverde, 628 F3d at 1167.
135

Id.

136 Id.

137 Lavilla, 3 Admin L J at 409 (cited in note 111).
138 Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v United States EPA, 705 F2d 506,
521 (DC Cir 1983). See generally Nina Golden and Carolyn Young, Harmful Error:How
the Courts' Failure to Apply the Harmless Error Doctrine has Obstructed the ADA's
Standing SpectatorsRule, 12 NYU J Legis & Pub Policy 1 (2008).
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rule might have been different had comment been allowed. And
the availability of post-promulgation comment does not rectify
the situation. As mentioned above, the ability of public comments
to shape the contents of a final rule is greatest at the beginning
of the process. Not only is an agency much less likely to give
weight to comments submitted after a rule has been promulgated, but there is also a disincentive for the agency to change the
rule according to the post-promulgation comments it receives. If
the agency bypassed notice and comment for good cause, changing the rule according to post-promulgation comment only brings
into question whether bypassing notice and comment was appropriate in the first place.
C.

Proposed Solution

The current circuit split brings attention to a persistent
problem with the good cause exception-it is overly vague. "Good
cause" remains undefined and susceptible to expansive interpretation because the language of the APA lacks specificity. It does
not provide sufficient guidance to agencies or to courts reviewing
agency decisions. This is particularly troublesome given the quasi-legislative function of regulatory agencies.
Certain steps should be taken to bring clarity to the exception. First, Congress should amend the statute to incorporate
more specific and concrete terminology. In an effort to compensate for the vagueness of the statute, courts have turned to
equally expansive language such as "emergency" and "serious
harm." This has only shifted the problem. The result is that
courts come to different conclusions under nearly identical fact
patterns.13 9 The difficulty with this solution is identifying language that will provide the desired concreteness without limiting
the flexibility the exception is intended to provide.
This is not the first time there has been a call to amend the
language of the APA. 140 Scholars have made similar demands,
and Congress has proposed bills aimed at just such modifications. Efforts to amend the language of the good cause provision
began as early as 1955 and have continued since. Most proposals
have sought to bring specificity to the provision by explicitly acknowledging situations of emergency. Other proposals seek to
excuse notice and comment when "unnecessary due to the insig-

139 Compare Dean, 604 F3d at 1276, with Cain, 583 F3d at 410.
140 Lavilla, 3 Admin L J at 416-22 (cited in note 111).
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nificant impact of the rule." 14 1 But these proposals have been unsuccessful. By the time they passed the Senate, most had returned to a formulation substantially similar to the existing language.
The unsuccessful attempts at amending section 553(b)(3)(B)
demonstrate the difficulty in identifying language that both narrows its use and preserves its flexibility. Regulatory agencies
often face unforeseeable events that require swift action. But
while it remains important to maintain flexibility in administrative rulemaking, changes are needed to bring clarity to the good
cause exception so as to increase consistency in judicial decisions.
The APA's legislative history reveals that amending the language of the APA is an unlikely remedy. Yet the recent circuit
split involving the Attorney General's interim rule may provide
the necessary impetus for reconsideration.
Second, the requirements for the "brief statement" that must
accompany the rule when an agency invokes the good cause exception should be made more stringent. When an agency seeks to
bypass notice and comment on account of a perceived emergency
or where delay would cause real harm, the APA should require
agencies to include a detailed explanation of how delay would
result in an identifiable, measurable, and significant impact on
public safety. Requiring that the agency make such a showing
would help preserve the integrity of the notice and comment procedure and would also provide the court with the information
needed to balance the potential harm caused by delay against
public participation in notice and comment. Additionally, the
information would prevent the good cause exception from becoming a standard with an "adjustable parameter that can be invoked by an agency, and interpreted broadly by a court, in circumstances of perceived emergency."142 The Eleventh Circuit's
reasonable belief standard is inadequate for purposes of circumscribing the power given to regulatory agencies.
One concern with this approach is that in some situations it
might be difficult to provide the concrete evidence a more stringent statement would require. One can imagine certain regulations where statistical or other concrete evidence would be unavailable. But this is likely to be a relatively small number of

Id.
Adrian Vermeule, OurSchmittian Administrative Law, 122 Harv L Rev 1095, 1105
(2009). See generally Ronald M. Levin, DirectFinalRulemaking, 64 Geo Wash L Rev 1
(1995).
141

142
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situations, and they can be handled on a case-by-case basis. 143
Another potential objection to placing additional requirements on the agency seeking to bypass notice and comment is
that requiring concrete evidence reduces the flexibility the exception was intended to provide regulatory agencies. While it is true
that some flexibility will be lost, the result would be less ambiguity and vagueness in determining whether the good cause exception was utilized properly. For those situations where the exception is both necessary and justified, there should be little difficulty in providing the required concrete evidence.
Third, in situations where emergency or harm is used by an
agency to justify the good cause exception, the emergency or
harm must have become more severe since the time Congress
gave the agency statutory authority to make the rule. Such a requirement would keep the exception confined to where it is most
useful and appropriate. The good cause exception gives a great
deal of power to agencies. In giving power to agencies to bind the
nation, Congress has authority to allow the agency to bypass the
notice and comment period. If Congress chooses not to explicitly
exempt the agency from notice and comment requirements, it
should be interpreted as Congress affirmatively denying the existence of an emergency or harm serious enough to bypass notice
and comment based upon the knowledge Congress possessed at
the time it passed the statute.
Congress recognizes the delay that is associated with the
process of informal rulemaking and is the appropriate representative body to balance the urgency of implementation against
the importance of public participation. Thus, the exception
should only be available when events have transpired that Congress did not have the opportunity to consider when passing the
statute granting rulemaking authority. If the agency determines
that circumstances now merit invoking the good cause exception,
it should detail, as mentioned above, what events have increased
the need for immediate implementation of the rule that did not
exist at the time Congress balanced the competing interests
when it passed the statute. It is not enough to merely claim that
additional delay would cause harm and therefore be against the
public interest. Presumably, every regulation is in the public interest, which is why it is being promulgated in the first place.
Thus, delaying its implementation is necessarily contrary to it. A
higher standard is necessary.
143 Lavilla, 3 Admin L at 343 (cited in note 111).
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The Attorney General's rehashing of the dangers presented
by sex offenders and sexual abuse was insufficient. More must be
shown. The Attorney General should have included in the statement of reasons concrete evidence as to why the dangers of sex
offenders became greater seven months after Congress passed
SORNA. For example, the Attorney General might provide statistical data pointing to an uptick in sex offenses. Another possibility might be providing evidence as to why the current framework for tracking sex offenders has recently become less effective
or is consistently under-prosecuted. The key element is that
something must have occurred to create an emergency or harm
that is greater in magnitude than when Congress considered the
issue. Otherwise, the agency is simply performing its own balancing act and giving it greater deference than that given to the
appropriate representative body, Congress.
III. CONCLUSION
A split of authority exists among the circuit courts as to
whether the Attorney General promulgated the interim rule
making SORNA retroactive in accordance with the procedural
requirements of the APA. This Comment rejects the position of
the majority of circuits that the Attorney General's public safety
argument provided sufficient justification for invoking the good
cause exception to bypass the required notice and comment period. The circuits in the majority failed to give adequate weight to
Congress's balancing of the need to immediately implement
SORNA retroactively against the value of public participation in
rulemaking. This Comment also rejects the reasoning behind the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits' holding that the interim rule was invalidly promulgated. Although correct in result, these circuits
focused too much on the emergency aspect of the good cause exception and neglected the argument that delay might bring serious harm to the public. The good cause exception should be
equally available in situations where delay would cause serious
harm, even if the urgency that typically accompanies an emergency is absent.
This Comment has suggested three changes that can be
made to help ensure that the good cause exception is not abused
so as to violate fundamental principles of representative democracy. First, Congress should amend the language of the section
553(b)(3)(B) to provide more clarity and guidance to agencies.
Second, the requirements of the "brief statement" should be
made more stringent so that the agency is required to show how
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delay would result in an identifiable, measurable, and significant
impact on public safety. Third, the emergency or type of harm
that delay would cause must be of a greater magnitude or different nature than existed at the time Congress granted the agency
rulemaking authority and chose not to free the agency from the
procedural requirements of the APA.
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